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Labor and management are important cogs in the 
American capitalist machine. One cannot exist without the 
other. However, good relations between labor and 
management can be tenuous. When the desires of labor and 
management are out of balance, the relationship can 
deteriorate, sometimes resulting in violence. Such was the 
case at the steel mills of the Republic Steel Corporation in 
and around Youngstown, Ohio in 1937. Republic Steel was 
not in the top tier of steel producers in 1937. Larger 
companies, like United States Steel Corporation or 
Bethlehem Steel operated more facilities and turned larger 
profits than Republic Steel. Trying to keep pace with its 
competitors, in the early months of 1937, Republic rejected 
advances by labor organizers to unionize its employees. 
Believing unionization would have an adverse effect on its 
profit margin, the Youngstown mainstay’s steadfast 
determination to remain union-less added pressure to an 
increasingly tense situation. Labor unrest was growing 
throughout the U.S. and Republic Steel experienced strikes 
in other cities where they also operated. On the evening of 
June 19, 1937, during a union demonstration at one of 
Republic’s mills, violence struck Youngstown, Ohio. 
Republic employees clashed with local police, sheriff’s 
deputies, and company security causing two deaths and 
scores of injuries. Republic’s northeastern Ohio facilities 
were not the only locations of confrontation between labor 
and management, but the confrontation there, which left 
two people dead, illuminates the dangers of neglecting 
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harmony between labor, management, and the local 
community. 
Since the financial success of both Republic’s labor 
and management depended on a collegial relationship, the 
devolving and embittered situation in which those involved 
were willing to take each other’s lives was extraordinary. 
People with, at best, a tangential interest in the outcome, 
like law enforcement, felt empowered to use deadly force 
against fellow citizens engaged in a financial dispute. 
Republic’s leadership was not concerned with the welfare 
of its employees, who were beaten and shot. Rather, they 
were indifferent so long as a docile workforce could be 
maintained. Attitudes about community, economics, 
patriotism, and stewardship held by Republic’s leader Tom 
M. Girdler hold the key to understanding the outbreak of 
violence in Youngstown, Ohio during the sweltering 
summer months of 1937.  
Tom Girdler led the Republic Steel Corporation as 
either its president or board chairman from 1929–1956.1 He 
was a mechanical engineer by education, but his real talent 
was management. His upbringing, training, and experience 
evolved into a philosophy called Girdlerism—a version of 
paternalism that rewarded loyalty and rugged individualism 
and abhorred communism and unions. Under Girdler’s 
leadership, Republic Steel resisted unionization far longer 
than competitors in the steel industry.2 
 
1 Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, n.d. "Girdler, Tom Mercer," 
Encyclopedia of Cleveland History, Accessed October 1, 2017. 
https://case.edu/ech/articles/g/girdler-tom-mercer/. 
2 Two of the nation’s largest steel companies, United States Steel and 
Bethlehem Steel agreed to terms with union negotiators on May 2, 
1937 and March 28, 1941, respectively. Republic Steel held out until 
August 11, 1942 when director of industrial relations, J.A.Voss, signed 
a contract with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. For more 
information, see: Tom M. Girdler, Boot Straps, (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1943), 374; Bethlehem Area Public Library, n.d. 
“1941 Bethlehem Steel Strike,” Bethlehem Area Public Library, 
https://www.bapl.org/local-history/local-history-
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Republic Steel was a so-called “Little Steel” 
company—a moniker given to secondary companies that 
did not command the same market share as firms like the 
United States Steel Corporation or Bethlehem Steel.3 In the 
years preceding 1937, labor groups at firms of various sizes 
began to organize as company-sanctioned unions. Steel 
companies allowed their employees to organize if they did 
so as a company union. Company unions, outlawed today, 
were groups of workers that met under the supervision of 
their employers. Under this arrangement, workers were not 
actually free to voice disagreement with the company nor 
were they protected by a binding contract. These ‘unions’ 
allowed employees to feel like their concerns were being 
addressed while simultaneously allowing companies to 
exert influence and retain control over their workforce.4 In 
1937, this balance shifted. A new, more aggressive 
organization, the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) began to organize workers.5 The CIO organized 
outside the workplace and its membership was open to 
anyone who wanted to join. Steel companies hated this new 
model of unionization because it removed power from 
 
timeline/steelstrike1941/; Global Nonviolent Action Database, n.d. 
“United States steelworkers strike for a contract and union recognition, 
1937,” Global Nonviolent Action Database, 
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/united-states-steelworkers-
strike-contract-and-union-recognition-1937. 
3 “Little Steel Strike of 1937,” Ohio History Connection, accessed 
March 9, 2017, 
http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/w/Little_Steel_Strike_of_1937. 
4 United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Characteristics od Company Unions 1935: Bulletin No. 364, Division 
of Industrial Relations, Florence Peterson, Chief (Washington, DC, 
June 1937), 199–205. 
5 Mansel G. Blackford, A Portrait Cast in Steel: Buckeye International 
and Columbus, Ohio. 1881-1980 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1982), 122–125. 
4  Spring 2021 
 
management and transferred it to labor. However, the 
writing was on the wall and in early 1937 the United States 
Steel Corporation acquiesced and struck an agreement with 
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), a CIO 
entity. SWOC bargained for U.S. Steel’s employees and 
won the contract without a strike.6 U.S. Steel’s history 
involved clashes with labor before 1937 and its leadership 
calculated that negotiation with labor was preferable to 
more bloodshed. This new arrangement was problematic 
for companies like Republic. It created a situation that 
emboldened the CIO as it began to wield power. Republic, 
and other companies, resisted the formation of non-
company unions and this resistance led to violence. 
 
Labor Relations and Government Regulation, 1890–
1937 
 
To understand violence across the Republic Steel 
Corporation in 1937 it is necessary to examine U.S. 
labor/management relations in the preceding decades. 
During the late 1800s some American workers began to 
agitate for better pay and working conditions. Improvement 
for workers, however, came at a cost to employers. This 
expense threatened profitability and workforce control. As 
employees escalated demands, management turned to 
private security firms to quell the boldness of labor. The 
most famous private security organization was the 
Pinkerton National Detective Agency. The Pinkertons, and 
other groups like them, were accountable only to their 
customers and operated as de facto police forces. They 
were free to use coercion and violence to protect 
management’s property and business interests. Workplace 
 
6 Blackford, A Portrait Cast in Steel, 125. 
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laws were nearly non-existent before 1900 and companies 
took full advantage of notional regulation.7  
A confrontation that exemplified companies’ 
bravado at the time occurred at Andrew Carnegie’s steel 
mill in Homestead, Pennsylvania. Labor, represented by the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, 
disagreed with management over wages and control. 
Negotiation ensued, and an impasse was reached. During 
this impasse management took a more aggressive stance 
than usual. Instead of allowing work to continue, the 
workforce was locked out and operations ceased. With this 
tactic, management showed labor that it would suffer 
without their benevolence. Henry Clay Frick, Carnegie’s 
business partner and supervisor of Homestead, planned to 
bring in non-union workers to restart operations. But the 
workforce did something unexpected; it seized the mill by 
force of arms. Frick responded by calling in the Pinkertons. 
The next day, July 6th, 1892, the Pinkertons fought with 
Homestead workers and townsfolk. The ensuing fight, in 
which one side used a cannon, left 10 people dead: three 
workers and seven Pinkertons. Six days later, the 
Pennsylvania state militia was summoned to restore order. 
For all the trouble, little changed. The confrontation 
resolved none of the underlying issues and tensions 
remained high until November when the union relented, 
and some workers were allowed to return. Still other 
laborers were blacklisted. Carnegie won—operations 
resumed, and the workforce learned their place.8  
 
7 Robert Michael Smith, From Blackjacks to Briefcases: A History of 
Commercialized Strikebreaking and Unionbusting in the United States 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2003), 3–4. 
8 “Strike at Homestead Mill,” American Experience, accessed March 
12, 2017, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carnegie/sfeature/mh_horror.html. 
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After the Homestead Strike, prevailing trends in 
American business continued to favor capitalists over the 
working class. The San Francisco streetcar strike of 1907 
serves as yet another example, pitting United Railways 
against employees represented by the Amalgamated 
Association of Street and Electrical Railway Employees of 
America, also known as the Carmen’s Union. The union 
decided to strike when Patrick Calhoun, United Railways’ 
president, rejected a request to raise workers’ daily wage to 
$3.00. Calhoun’s lawyer, James A. Farley, owned a 
detective agency and was a professional strike buster. 
Farley contracted 400 ruffians to travel from New York to 
San Francisco to work the jobs that strikers left. These 
hired hands stayed in one of the railcar storage barns, and 
the union knew they were there. After waiting a day, 
Calhoun ordered Farley’s men to operate six cars in 
defiance of the union’s strike. Like the strikers before them, 
they wore United Railways uniforms. Unlike the strikers, 
Farley’s men worked armed with revolvers. Once the cars 
left the barn, the strikers threw rocks and bricks at the 
vehicles and the strikebreakers responded by firing on 
them. Men remaining in the barn also opened fire on the 
strikers. This event left 25 people mortally or seriously 
wounded.9 
In both of these important antecedents, corporate 
leadership hired outside workers to intimidate workers with 
the intent of breaking strikes. The message was clear—the 
powerful capitalists running these companies would not 
tolerate having the terms of their livelihoods dictated to 
them. It was in management’s long-term economic interest 
to refuse union demands. Had they not done so, they would 
have willingly increased the legitimacy and bargaining 
power of unions, threatening the order and discipline 
needed to maximize profits. Furthermore, the Homestead 
Strike involved governmental authorities in the form of the 
 
9 Smith, 40, 50–52. 
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state militia arriving on scene. The militia were nominally 
neutral, but their presence further intimidated the striking 
steel workers, thus benefiting Carnegie’s position. 
Government intervention in San Francisco, however, 
benefited the strikers. Local police were displeased that 
outside, private muscle came to their city agitating 
violence. The police warned the newcomers that, “if any 
strikebreakers start shooting from the cars, they will be shot 
in return by the police.”10 Mismanagement from a lack of 
direction produced decidedly different outcomes as 
governmental leaders at each scene acted without guidance 
telling them which side to support. State, and for that 
matter national, legislatures failed to provide regulatory and 
legal guidance to enforcement agencies in handling violent 
or potentially violent labor disputes. 
The early 1900s showed that the relationship 
between labor and management was devolving to an 
untenable situation. Carnegie’s use of the Pinkertons and 
United Railways’ unleashing of Farley and his men were 
catalysts for change. Laws that governed 
labor/management relations and addressed wages and 
working conditions were enacted because of incidents like 
Homestead and San Francisco. 
In 1935, labor scored a legislative victory with the 
passage of the National Labor Relations Act, more 
commonly referred to as the Wagner Act for its 
namesake—New York Senator Robert R. Wagner. The 
Wagner Act guaranteed the right of labor to organize and 
bargain collectively, prohibited interference by 
management, and established an independent board to 
 
10 Smith, 52. 
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administer the law.11 The Wagner Act was a departure from 
previous judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act of 
1890 which sought to ensure fair competition among 
businesses. The Sherman Act required prohibition of 
“…combinations or conspiracies in restraint of interstate or 
foreign commerce and provided for criminal prosecution, 
injunctions, and suits for triple damages for violations.”12 
Congress designed the Sherman Act to protect the 
American economy from monopolies by ensuring that one 
company or trust could not become too powerful. 
Corporations adapted by using the Sherman Act against 
labor unions. They argued that because labor unions could 
affect the flow of interstate commerce and its rates, they 
conspired against organic fundamental operations and were 
therefore in violation of the law. The Supreme Court 
upheld this interpretation in Loewe v. Lawlor, also referred 
to at the Danbury Hatters’ case.13 It appeared that workers’ 
rights were subservient to corporate profitability, at least in 
the eyes of Congress and the federal judiciary. These 
Sherman Act machinations occurred during the first decade 
of the twentieth century. Labor unions and progressive 
allies struggled for the following two decades to score a 
major victory in their fight for rights until the passage of 
the Wagner Act.  
The Wagner Act was a sufficiently written law that 
defined conditions precisely intended “to diminish the 
causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate 
and foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB), and for other purposes.”14 This stipulation 
 
11 Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner Act to 
Taft-Hartley: A Study of National Labor Policy and Labor Relations 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 28–29. 
12 Millis and Brown, 9. 
13 Ibid, 8–9; O. L. Clark, Application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to 
Unions since the Apex Case, 2 Sw L.J. 94 (1948) 
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol2/iss1/6.  
14 National Labor Relations Act, U.S. Code 29 (1935), §§ 151–169. 
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seemingly prioritized free-flowing commerce as the law’s 
priority. However, the remainder of the law enumerated 
rights and protections for labor that represented 
reconciliation for decades of abuse suffered by American 
workers at the hands of the United States’ industrial 
management hegemony. Despite good intentions, the 
Wagner Act was only partially effective at protecting 
workforces from unfair labor practices. Because of cultural 
norms, workers feared retribution by management. Local, 
state, and federal authorities remained impotent in their 
responses to labor/management disagreements even after 
the Wagner Act’s passage. The Wagner Act was under-
enforced, and management continued to wield unchecked 
power. Meaningful change did not occur until more blood 
was shed, particularly during the Republic Steel 
confrontation in Youngstown. 
The Wagner Act specified that, “Employees shall 
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist 
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing…”15 This was the 
most important text within the legislation as it established 
legal protection for laborers. Prior to the Wagner Act, 
employees were merely a commodity, but with its passage, 
their wishes had to be considered. In addition to 
recognizing labor as more than a tool of management, the 
act also prohibited practices such as interference in union 
activities, hiring discrimination based upon union 
affiliation, and retribution by management.  
Management viewed the new protections granted to 
labor as unwelcome intrusions by the government into 
private enterprise. After passing through Congress with 
almost no opposition, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
 
15 National Labor Relations Act, U.S. Code 29 (1935), §§ 151–169. 
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signed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) into law 
on July 5th, 1935.16 Some saw this legislation as anti-
American and patriarchal, resulting in immediate legal 
challenges from private business. The new law established 
workers’ rights and prohibitions of certain management 
practices, and also established a National Labor Relations 
Board to act as an enforcement body ensuring that violators 
were sanctioned. However, before the board was organized 
the American Liberty League—a conservative advocacy 
group whose members opposed New Deal reforms 
generally, and the Wagner Act specifically—questioned the 
Wagner Act’s constitutionality in a scathing report that 
suggested the new law placed excessive restriction on 
individual rights. The Wagner Act was under attack and its 
survival depended on the opinion of the Supreme Court.17 
On April 12th, 1937, the Supreme Court held that 
the Wagner Act was constitutional and provided “adequate 
opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary 
action.”18 With the Supreme Court’s endorsement, labor 
began to influence American industry. Management did not 
stand idly by, though, and allow their control to be usurped. 
A response to widespread patterns of managerial behavior 
that oppressed and dehumanized labor, the Wagner Act 
provided the legislation required to stop the brazenness 
with which employers treated their workers. Homestead, 
San Francisco, and the struggle to pass the Wagner Act 




To understand violence throughout the Republic 
Steel Corporation in 1937, it is imperative to understand 
 
16 Millis and Brown, 28.; The vote tally for the National Labor 
Relations Act was 132-45 in the House of Representatives. It passed 
the Senate without a record vote. 
17 Ibid, 36. 
18 Ibid, 40. 
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Tom Girdler’s background. In many ways, Girdler was the 
embodiment of that which business and capital tried to 
protect. He believed in strength, patriotism, and 
independence. He also eschewed the union ethos which 
valued workers as vital and hard-to-replace partners in 
industry’s success. Tom Girdler opposed the leadership of 
the CIO literally and figuratively. Literally, in that he 
ordered his employees to resist the formation of a union 
and figuratively in that he personified the practices that 
SWOC and the CIO tried to defeat. 
 Girdler gave his autobiography an ironic title: Boot 
Straps. To pull oneself up by their bootstraps implies that 
their road to success was within reach but required self-
motivation. In Girdler’s case, this could not have been 
further from the truth. Two circumstances, his financial 
well-being while attending college and his ascendency to 
leadership of his father’s business, illustrate that Girdler’s 
rise to industrial rule was assured. Girdler thus represented 
the classic hypocritical industrialist who assumed hard 
work was enough without realizing his own privilege.  
Tom Girdler attended Lehigh University, 
benefitting from the finances of his paternal aunt, Jenny. 
Aunt Jenny believed education to be important and 
promised to help Girdler attend college. His matriculation 
began in 1897, studying mechanical engineering. 
Beginning that year, Aunt Jenny saw to Girdler’s monthly 
expenses. By the end of the first year, they agreed upon a 
$50.00 monthly allowance. Girdler thrived at Lehigh. He 
sang in a church choir, belonged to a fraternity and forged 
strong friendships. One friend, Cy Roper, provided Girdler 
an opportunity to work in England after graduation in 1901. 
He worked for Roper in England for about a year, became 
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homesick, and returned to the U.S. by March of 1902.19 
Because of his time at Lehigh and his family’s 
benevolence, Girdler achieved academically and expanded 
his mind through travel. His family, via Aunt Jenny’s 
stipend, provided him with the security that ensured an 
undemanding path from adolescence to adulthood. Later in 
life, during his time as chairman of the Republic Steel 
Corporation, his employees fought for this same security 
and Tom Girdler stood in their way. 
During the summers of his college years, Girdler 
worked in the family business. His father owned a cement 
plant that did well, but production could be better. One 
summer, Girdler’s father fell ill and needed to step back 
from running the factory. The business’s treasurer, Thomas 
Cooper, concocted a scenario in which Girdler would take 
over the business. Girdler’s father was dubious. The elder 
Girdler did not feel anyone beside him could run the 
factory. Alas, needing a rest, he relented, and Tom Girdler 
entered the world of management. Girdler described his 
father as enslaved to duty. Tom wasn’t interested in 
running a cement business, but he revered his father and his 
way of life. Thus, duty compelled him to manage the 
cement plant until his father could return. Girdler worked 
relentlessly. During that summer, the cement plant broke 
production records. While other men ate lunch, he worked. 
When other men went home for the night, he worked.20 
Girdler’s drive may have been due to his work ethic or it 
may have been due to his idolization of his father. Either 
way, he saw himself as driven and other men as lazy. This 
attitude of self-righteousness dominated Girdler’s 
interactions with labor for his entire career. 
Girdler’s stance toward labor hardened when 
attitude turned to action. Before running Republic Steel, 
 
19 Tom M. Girdler, Boot Straps, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1943), 65–66, 83, 9. 
20 Ibid, 73–79. 
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Girdler spent time at various levels of management in other 
companies. One of these firms was the Oliver Iron & Steel 
Company. Early in his career, Girdler was a foreman for 
Oliver. One day, one of his subordinates finished his work 
and tried to leave a few minutes early, which was in 
violation of company policy. Workers were expected to 
start another task if it could be completed within a few 
minutes after quitting time. Many workers were unhappy 
with this rule and one man challenged it by leaving early. 
Girdler ordered the man back to his post and when he did 
not go Girdler punched the man and a fight ensued. Girdler 
beat the man unconscious. After the incident, Girdler’s boss 
was only concerned with who won the fight and fired the 
worker.21 Girdler had only graduated college a year earlier 
and was now a foreman, the lowest management position in 
a steel mill. He knew that the worker’s actions were an 
affront to his authority. This knowledge combined with his 
inexperience resulted in a quicker escalation than 
necessary. Girdler surmised that his place in the 
labor/management ecosystem would be secure if he 
protected the interests of capital. The man’s dismissal along 
with Girdler’s continued ascension proved he was right. 
This lesson, combined with his belief that labor was 
inherently lazy, guided Girdler’s business decisions and 
evolved into a management philosophy called Girdlerism.22 
Intense control of labor through policies and practices that 
 
21 Girdler, 96–97. 
22 The origins of the term “Girdlerism” are unclear but it appeared in 
newspapers as early as 1938. Historians of the 1930s steel industry 
have also included their work. For more information, see Gordon 
Mackay, “Is Zat So!,” Courier-Post, August 23, 1938, 9, 
https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/480359653/; Ahmed White, 
The Last Great Strike: Little Steel, the CIO, and the Struggle for Labor 
Rights in New Deal America (Oakland, California: University of 
California Press, 2016), 63. 
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define the role of the worker as inferior characterized 
Girdlerism. If labor did not try to re-define itself outside the 
bounds of this definition, there was peace. When labor 
upset the status quo, Girdlerism required management to 
preserve its paternal role.  
Violence that occurred at the Youngstown mill was 
the result of Girdler’s unrelenting desire to maintain 
control. When labor tried to organize, Republic only 
allowed company unions. When labor persisted via SWOC, 
Republic locked them out and slowed or stopped 
production at its facilities. When labor called a strike, 
Republic responded violently, and people were injured or 
killed. Republic Steel, under the leadership of Tom Girdler 
did not discriminate when it chose whom to apply the 
principles of Girdlerism. Workers, women, and non-
employees were all targets on the night of June 19th, 1937. 
Some believe that Girdlerism was a conscious set of policy 
decisions, but it was not. Instead, Girdlerism was sub-
conscious—a consequence of Girdler’s values and beliefs 
that beset a company climate in his image. The managers of 
Republic Steel shared a belief system rooted in vehement 
control of labor to maintain a status-quo. Girdler attempted 
to justify his philosophy by shrouding it in notions of 
paternalism, patriotism, and capitalism.  
While working for Jones and Loughlin, another 
steel company, in 1914, Girdler managed a steel mill: the 
Aliquippa Works at Woodlawn, Pennsylvania. There, he 
rose to the rank of Assistant General Superintendent—the 
highest position at Woodlawn.23 Later that same year, he 
became head of Jones and Laughlin’s company town that 
became Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. With Girdler as its leader, 
Aliquippa became “…a benevolent dictatorship.”24 He 
oversaw the town’s private police force and installed Harry 
 
23 Girdler, 171–172. 
24 Philip L. Cook, “Tom M. Girdler and the Labor Policies of Republic 
Steel Corporation,” Social Science January (1967): 25. 
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Mauk, a former Pennsylvania state trooper, to lead it. 
Girdler believed that his workers needed a paternalistic 
figure to guide them. Aliquippa, a town with all its homes 
owned by Jones and Loughlin and schools run likewise, 
afforded Girdler the opportunity to be that father-figure and 
control most areas of workers’ lives.25  
Patriotism was another value that informed 
Girdler’s leadership. Girdler described the United States’ 
advantage in World War II as follows, “all the superb 
mechanisms which will enable them to conquer the 
enemies of the United States are the products of this 
country’s great industrial corporations and could only have 
been created in such a short time by such organizations.”26 
The American ideal and the determination of the United 
States’ armed services took a backseat to industrialism for 
Girdler. He felt a responsibility to provide military means 
to defeat evil in the world. He also saw organized labor as a 
threat to success in this endeavor. At the time, men with 
communist leanings or were outright communists led the 
CIO.27 Girdler equated the idea of workers’ rights to 
communist sympathies. His version of patriotism would not 
allow communists to defile his vision of the American way. 
Thus, his rigid reaction to strikers in Youngstown was 
consistent with his belief system. Boot Straps was 
published in 1944, before both the end of the war and the 
onset of the Cold War. Accordingly, those events only 
reinforced his beliefs about communists, labor, and 
business. Further, as one of the U.S.’s most prominent 
captains of industry, Girdler was a chief architect of the 
 
25 Girdler, 73–79. 
26 Ibid, 2. 
27 Michael Dennis, Blood on Steel: The Chicago Steelworkers and the 
Strike of 1937 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 17. 
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nation’s attitude regarding communists, labor, and 
business. 
 Girdlerism’s roots are embedded in capitalist 
principles which prioritize profit above the well-being of 
workers. One of the main criticisms of capitalism is that it 
places excess wealth in the hands of too few people. One 
must be willfully self-deceptive to engineer this lack of 
balance into a business. Girdlerism was a tool used by 
those who controlled wealth to maintain a lack of balance 
and its inventor, Tom M. Girdler exercised it in its most 
perfect form. 
 
Youngstown, Niles, and Warren: Republic Steel’s Ohio 
Battlefields in 1937 
 
Violence erupted in Youngstown, Ohio on the 
evening of June 19th, 1937 when striking union members 
and agents for Republic Steel fought near Republic’s 
facilities. This encounter was brutal and deadly; two people 
died, and scores were badly injured. Several conditions 
explain why events that day became bloody. First, 
leadership of Republic Steel was determined not to bend to 
the will of the CIO, acting through its steel industry 
organizing arm, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. 
Second, SWOC, was determined to organize workers of 
Republic Steel using new powers granted to it by the 
Wagner Act. Third, local authorities were an invested third 
party because events took place in their city, not only on 
the grounds of Republic Steel. Finally, the attitudes of 
those involved were rooted in their self-images as 
Americans. Each believed their role legitimate and essential 
to the functioning of the United States—all also believed 
their opponents were wrong, misguided, or evil. 
The CIO’s strike against Republic Steel began on 
May 26th, 1937.28 Earlier that year, the organization sent a 
 
28 White, 125. 
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letter of demands that included a $5.00 daily minimum 
wage, paid vacations, a 40-hour work week, overtime pay, 
health and safety standards, and a grievances settlement 
process.29 Tom Girdler was dumbstruck by the fact that his 
workers wanted improvements in any of these areas but 
particularly in safety. “Just ordinary carelessness, such as 
management has engineered out of the industry, can cause 
horrible accidents.” Girdler also suggested that although 
management had virtually eliminated accidents, there were 
“planned mishaps” concocted to coerce CIO membership.30 
There was, however, enough employee unrest to enable 
SWOC’s organizing efforts to take hold, but Girdler 
refused to acknowledge their concerns. He refused the 
demands of the CIO letter and did so because he believed 
there was a faction of workers loyal to him. A large 
majority of Republic’s employees joined the CIO, but some 
did not. Girdler clung to the idea that these few were 
virtuous while those who joined the CIO were 
dishonorable. While pseudo-negotiations ensued, the group 
of men that Girdler preferred met with another of the 
company’s leaders, Charles White. Girdler claimed that, at 
that meeting, they stated to White, “If Girdler signs an 
agreement with the C.I.O., we strike!”31 This was music to 
Girdler’s ears. In his mind, it gave him a moral justification 
to reject SWOC’s demands. 
Girdler knew a strike was inevitable, so he 
prepared. He anticipated violence and prior to the 
beginning of the strike, Girdler ordered that each Republic 
Steel plant be supplied with tear gas. This move showed his 
hand. Girdler meant to break the strikers’ will and was 
prepared to use force. He wrote that he instructed his staff 
 
29 White, 119. 
30 Girdler, 280. 
31 Ibid, 228. 
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to avoid violence but reminded them of their obligation to 
protect Republic’s property and defend workers who 
remained inside the facilities during a strike.32 Surely, he 
knew that if his men used tear gas, then local authorities 
would arrive and intervene on behalf of the city’s private 
enterprise. In Youngstown, Niles, and Warren this was 
exactly what happened.  
Prior to the strike, SWOC distributed handbills as 
workers left the plants. These papers served as recruitment 
tools for SWOC.33 Newly recruited members then held 
organizing meetings in homes, churches, and bars.34 
Leaders were elected, and pickets were organized. SWOC 
needed to operate in accordance with the Wagner Act. So, 
in the months leading up to the strike, Lee Pressman, 
SWOC’s lead legal counsel instructed membership to 
record all violations of their rights.35 
Once the strike was on, the union’s tactics became a 
bit more questionable. SWOC and its members felt they 
were engaged in an ideological and material war with 
Republic Steel. To that end, they used whatever tactics 
necessary to advance their cause. According to Tom 
Girdler, the union needed to keep men who wanted to work 
out of the plants. To accomplish this, Girdler wrote of the 
strikers, “This was done by pickets carrying clubs, guns, 
razors, and other weapons. Very few of these pickets were 
Republic employees.”36 Whether Girdler’s claims are 
accurate or not is difficult to confirm but the National 
Labor Relations Board found that the union barred entry of 
non-union workers into the plants.37 For the strike to work, 
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SWOC needed Republic to feel economic pain. Their 
method was to deny plants supplies and cease production. It 
started to work. 
As the strike began in Warren, men left at the end of 
their shifts intending to begin picketing while also trying to 
recruit others to their cause. Standing between them and 
potential recruits, however, were the plant superintendent 
and a couple hundred “loyal” workers and bosses armed 
with sledgehammers, pikes and other weapons. The 
superintendent shouted to them, “Come on you sons-of-
bitches, we are waiting for you.” Another group trying to 
leave the Warren facility also met resistance and were told, 
“You have to stay here to protect your jobs… If you go 
home you won’t have any more jobs in this department.”38 
Republic Steel was clearly willing to resort to intimidation 
and violence to maintain the status quo, but the CIO and its 
members were likewise prepared to stand their ground. 
On Saturday May 30th, 1937, SWOC leadership in 
Ohio met with representatives for the Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers. Steel mills connect to railroad lines 
that deliver steel making materials and distribute the 
finished product. Republic wanted to use their lines to 
deliver food and other supplies to workers who remained 
inside defying SWOC’s wishes. SWOC appealed to their 
fraternal brothers in the Engineers union to convince them 
not to make deliveries.39 Their efforts were somewhat 
successful. In describing an exchange with the railroads, 
Girdler wrote of the engineers’ commitments, “…we’ll 
haul coal, iron ore, or finished steel as usual. But we won’t 
haul munitions.” Those ‘munitions’ included food and 
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clothing.40 The union needed the engineers’ help because 
they could not hope to stop a locomotive physically. Mail 
trucks, on the other hand, could not get through the human 
picket lines around Ohio’s Republic facilities. Republic 
authorities attempted to mail food into the plants from 
Cleveland, but the union suspected the tactic and stopped 
deliveries.41 With the situation becoming desperate, 
Republic devised an ingenious solution to defeat the 
SWOC siege.  
Tom Girdler was an engineer by training, and he 
attacked the siege problem like one. Girdler examined 
Republic’s resources, assessed tactical success 
probabilities, determined material cost and the cost to 
Republic’s reputation, and decided on a course of action. 
The Niles plant was in dire straits. Girdler’s leadership 
team considered driving food near the plant, but they 
abandoned that idea because strikers controlled all roads 
around the facility. They considered using trains and mail, 
but those methods had already been thwarted. Another 
thought was to use a tank to deliver food, which Republic 
had because they were contracted to provide armor and 
needed to test steel on a working model. This was also 
rejected because the Republic men decided it would lead to 
bloodshed. Finally, they decided to try aerial resupply.42 
Several Republic employees who owned airplanes 
as well as private contractors were mobilized to drop food 
into the plants. The Niles plant was the site of the first 
attempt. It was off target and the strikers ended up with 
supplies intended for workers in the plant. Subsequent 
drops were successful, and the workers got food and 
domestic supplies. Within a few days, workers inside the 
Niles plant were able to fashion a makeshift runway that 
Republic used to fly men and supplies in and out. The 
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union also used planes to perform reconnaissance. The CIO 
needed to know what work was ongoing and they used 
planes to circle the plants and collect information.43 The 
airplane strategy worked but it was not a long-term 
solution. Steel making supplies could not get into the plants 
and product could not get out. With both sides dug-in, 
something had to give.  
The strike languished for several more weeks into 
the beginning of June 1937. Meanwhile, Republic tried to 
gather support from law enforcement in cities where work 
had stopped. On June 15th, Girdler distributed a statement 
to employees that, in part, read, “Employees kept from their 
jobs by mobs of armed pickets many of whom have never 
worked for Republic and citizens outraged by this defiance 
of law and decency by the C.I.O. are joining together to 
insist that law enforcement agencies compel the union to 
cease unlawful picketing.”44 While Girdler’s statement 
reassured uninvolved employees, it also called for them to 
pressure local authorities. Girdler tried to start a grassroots 
campaign to benefit one of America’s most prosperous 
companies. He wanted those on the sidelines to agitate for 
local police and sheriff’s departments to enter the fray. 
When fighting erupted in Youngstown the police and 
sheriff’s deputies that were involved protected Republic’s 
interests—not the workers. 
There were only a few points of entry at Republic’s 
Youngstown mill. This made it easy for strikers to control 
the flow of people in and out of the mill. One of these 
points was “Stop 5.” On the evening of Saturday, June 
19th, 1937—three weeks into the strike—gunfire erupted, 
and John Bogovich and James Eperjesi were killed outside 
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the Republic plant in Youngstown.45 Accounts of the fight 
report that at least 26 people were wounded, however the 
actual number may have been upwards of 60. Dozens more 
suffered the effects of tear gas.46 The community was 
changed by this incident and divisions between labor and 
management deepened. Both factions and bystanders saw 
parts of their city damaged by disagreements between labor 
and management. The costs of these confrontations were 
materially high but the cost in human life and peace of 
mind were even higher. The lives of those involved and 
their loved ones changed forever.  
Accounts of the events vary, and the genesis of 
fighting is unclear. One account, purportedly from an 
eyewitness, suggested that Youngstown police provoked 
the incident. The eyewitness described a scene in which 
women picketers arranged themselves for a photograph. 
One had a camera and while others sat on folding chairs, a 
Youngstown police officer snatched the camera from the 
would-be photographer’s hands. Upon seeing this, the 
photographer’s husband, who was nearby, tried to wrestle 
the camera away from the police officer. Things escalated 
quickly; the police lost control of themselves and the 
situation. In contrast to others, this account stated that the 
police opened fire with bullets as well as tear gas.47 This 
account blamed the beginning of the battle on the police 
and described them as a group of people itching for 
confrontation. The account was sympathetic to SWOC and 
saw its tactics as just. Others saw the beginning of the 
encounter at Stop 5 differently. 
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Newspaper reports of the event varied. The 
Cleveland Plain Dealer was the largest daily publisher in 
the immediate vicinity of Youngstown. Its reporting on the 
opening salvos of the battle indicated that the women failed 
to follow police instruction to move further from Republic 
property. The Plain Dealer also identified them as the CIO 
Women’s League. Because of their refusal to leave, the 
police used three shells of tear gas. The crowd then 
dispersed, reorganized and marched on police. The Plain 
Dealer implied the melee began because the Women’s 
League failed to comply.48 The language used in the Plain 
Dealer article portrayed the strikers as wild and 
uncontrollable. It mentioned no gunfire on the part of the 
police and was specific about the number of tear gas shells 
fired. The tone of the article painted authorities as ‘good-
guys’ and the union as ‘bad-guys’. Likewise, when the 
Chicago Daily Tribune summed up the evening’s events 
seven days later its reporting cast the strikers in an 
unfavorable light. The Tribune called the strikers “a wild 
throng of enraged pickets.” The article did not indicate 
strikers’ motivations, but it did, tellingly, call the CIO an 
“all-powerful labor dictatorship.”49 This language 
reinforced communist accusations leveled at the CIO. 
Rather than reporting on the Youngstown strike, the 
Tribune used their platform to advocate for Republic Steel, 
authority, and the economic status-quo. 
The chairman of Republic Steel was the most 
extreme in blaming the CIO and SWOC for the violence. In 
his autobiography, Boot Straps, Tom Girdler recounted the 
events that started the strike. “As for the women, they were 
anything but peaceful. They were, in fact, the same 
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truculent, foul-mouthed type that Communist strategists 
have used repeatedly to provoke a riot brawl with 
policemen. And this riot was provoked. It had been 
planned.”50 Girdler, although not present for the encounter, 
described it in exhaustive detail. He claimed that the 
women would not follow police instruction, spat at them, 
and even cursed them—sometimes in a foreign language. 
He also emphasized that the women sat on folding chairs 
and boxes, which supposedly incited the police. In addition 
to besmirching the character of the women, Girdler’s 
account suggested that union agents waited just beyond the 
vicinity of the female picketers so they could pounce if 
there was trouble with the police. Girdler described the 
Stop 5 incident as a coordinated tactical ploy designed by 
SWOC, the CIO, and communists. In his mind, they used 
underhanded tricks such as gender baiting and provocation 
to pull the police into a confrontation they hoped to avoid. 
A successful strike threatened to undermine Girdler’s 
managerial ability and the union was beginning to outflank 
him. Production slowed and local support, which he needed 
to pressure workers into returning, was neutral. A union 
instigated confrontation only benefited public opinion of 
Girdler and Republic Steel.  
Donald Sofchalk presented another depiction of the 
Stop 5 incident in his 1961 dissertation examining the Little 
Steel Strike. Sofchalk began his discussion of the Stop 5 
incident by giving a detailed description of the terrain 
involved. He also described Stop 5 as a bottleneck or choke 
point into and out of the mill. Either side of the road at Stop 
5 was bounded by a river or a railroad embankment. This 
created an area controllable by anyone on the 
embankment’s high ground—a veritable killing field. To 
enter the facility, a person or vehicle had to go through an 
underpass in the embankment. According to Sofchalk, 
members of the Women’s League organized themselves on 
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the sidewalks and the driveway near the underpass. One 
issue with the protests on June 19th was that the women sat 
in chairs and were not walking. This amounted to 
provocation in the eyes of the police. An officer informed 
the women they were obstructing traffic, the picket line 
must be moving, and they could not sit. He gave them five 
minutes to correct themselves and when they did not, he 
discharged two or three tear gas grenades near the 
picketing. After this, confusion reigned, and a full-blown 
riot began.51 Sofchalk’s dissertation offered the most sober 
assessment of the Youngstown riot. The events that ignited 
violence that evening remain in dispute but what followed 
later that night is certain—the lives of two people ended on 
June 19th, 1937. 
John Bogovich and James Eperjesi were shot to 
death during the June 19th riot. The two victims that 
eventful night, Bogovich and Eperjesi, were steelworkers, 
European immigrants, and strikers. They worked together 
at Youngstown Sheet and Tube—another steel company 
involved in the Little Steel strike.52 The fact that they were 
not Republic Steel employees but were present at the 
incident is evidence that SWOC’s organization and 
fraternal ties among workers were assets to the union’s 
cause in Youngstown. Both Republic Steel and local law 
enforcement opposed that cause. It is undetermined which 
side fired the shots that killed Bogovich and Eperjesi. Like 
the Stop 5 events that led to riot, competing versions of the 
truth obscured the identities of Bogovich’s and Eperjesi’s 
killers.  
After the initial events at Stop 5, all sides agreed 
that things escalated quickly but that is the limit to their 
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agreement. Eyewitness testimony that appears favorable to 
the union claims that machine gun fire erupted from the 
“overhead cranes in the old tube mill.”53 This version 
leaves no doubt that someone inside the mill fired on the 
crowd. Girdler’s version contradicts this claim. He wrote, 
“I am satisfied that no shots were fired by any of the more 
than 800 men in our plant. They were mad that night. They 
wanted to go out and go after the rioters. But all such talk 
was discouraged and kept under control.”54 Not only did 
Girdler justify the behavior of his company by absolving it 
of any wrongdoing, he did so in a way that made him 
appear to be in total control. When he said that he was 
“satisfied,” Girdler’s words indicated that he was the 
ultimate authority that arbitrated right and wrong at 
Republic Steel. Furthermore, Girdler’s words betrayed his 
attitude toward his employees. He portrayed them as people 
of lesser emotional control who needed to be restrained. If 
this is what he thought of employees loyal to Republic 
during the strike, he must have believed worse about the 
strikers. 
John Bogovich was not initially involved with the 
strike on June 19th. After hearing about what was unfolding 
at the mill, Bogovich, like many other union members, 
rushed to the scene. It is undetermined who fired the bullet 
that killed Bogovich, but the anti-union forces seemed to be 
using tactical methods. According to an interview of striker 
Fred A. Fortunado, shooters inside the Republic mill 
opened fire when flares were sent into the air. The flares 
illuminated the scene and allowed gunmen to fire more 
accurately.55 It was during one of these illuminated 
moments that Bogovich was shot. Whether the fatal shot 
came from the police, a Republic agent, or a union 
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member, Bogovich was shot from distance. In contrast, a 
point-blank shotgun blast killed James Eperjesi. Like 
Bogovich, Eperjesi’s killer is unknown. Physical evidence 
suggests that the fatal shot came from the direction of the 
plant or the railroad embankment. Anti-union forces 
occupied both locations. One witness claimed that sheriff’s 
deputies shot Eperjesi from the back of a nearby truck and 
that he was killed while he ran for cover.56  
Most accounts of the deaths of John Bogovich and 
James Eperjesi ran counter to Girdler’s claim that his men 
fired no shots. His abdication of any Republic 
responsibility was an exercise intended to salvage both the 
reputations of himself and his company. The union, on the 
other hand, tried to use the deaths as a source of inspiration. 
At Bogovich’s funeral, a SWOC organizer named John 
Stephens said, “Tom Girdler and Frank Purnell are 
responsible for the death of this man, but his life has not 
been taken in vain. The cornerstone of the union has been 
cemented in his death.”57 The deaths of Bogovich and 
Eperjesi on July 19th did little to change the attitudes of 
SWOC, the CIO, and Republic Steel toward one other. It 
took another four years and a War Labor Board order until 




Two federal bodies, the National Labor Relations 
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Republic Steel during the 1930’s. First, in 1937, the 
Supreme Court found the Wagner Act to be constitutional. 
The CIO and SWOC based most of their organizing 
strategy on the rights afforded to them by the Wagner 
Act.59 This decision granted legitimacy to labor unions 
across the country and served as a threat to companies like 
Republic Steel. Then, in 1939 the NLRB found that 
Republic Steel operated in a manner that violated the 
Wagner Act by using intimidation tactics and dismissing 
employees who tried to organize. Under the power granted 
to it by the NLRA, the National Labor Relations Board 
ordered Republic Steel to compensate employees whom 
they harmed financially or physically during the Little Steel 
strike. The NLRB also reaffirmed the freedom to unionize 
without molestation and required that workers fired for 
union affiliation be re-hired. Furthermore, Republic Steel 
had to report to the NLRB the steps it took to implement 
their orders.60 Against the backdrop of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal, federal entities began to make policy and 
decisions that took power from corporations and placed 
some in the hands of the working class. Labor 
organizations took full advantage of the changing climate. 
Some corporations resisted the winds of change. Where 
resistance was strong, labor and management clashed, and 
sometimes violence ensued. Republic Steel, led by one of 
the most ardent opponents of labor rights, Tom Girdler, 
resorted to violent means when no other option seemed 
plausible. 
Police justification for lethal violence is tenuous at 
best, judging from available evidence. Accounts vary as to 
the levels of danger law enforcement officers were in. 
Judging the behavior of the female strikers and their 
motivations is also difficult because of the difference in 
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descriptions of that fateful evening. Nevertheless, for 
laborers nationwide, a new era was emerging that promised 
greater bottom-up influence in decision making to bring 
better conditions, higher pay, and shorter hours. For 
management, however, this upcoming labor-centric period 
foretold an end to outright dominance over workers’ rights 
and lives. When management’s fears of the future clashed 
with labor’s hope, confrontation was inevitable. The degree 
to which that confrontation escalated was dependent upon 
the commitment that both sides gave to their ideals. In 
Youngstown, on June 19th, 1937 those commitments ran 
deep. 
Historians have written very little about the conflict 
at Republic Steel’s Youngstown operations, yet this event 
nevertheless remains an important episode within the broad 
arc of worker struggles in America. Republic Steel, albeit 
less productive than “Big Steel” firms like U.S. Steel and 
Bethlehem, was nonetheless an important component of the 
latent American industrial power that played such a critical 
role in the country’s ascendency to world economic 
leadership. The strike, and subsequent status quo ante 
bellum at the plant, likewise presaged an era of continued 
antagonism between labor and capital that continues to this 
day. Regardless, the Republic workers’ strike and the 
violent aftermath in Youngstown, Ohio demonstrated an 
important juncture in the long history of capitalist 
exploitation of workers in the United States.  
 
